With Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria now all embroiled in rebellions, it  is not an exaggeration to suggest that the authoritarian lid that has  smothered freedom in the Arab world for centuries may be coming off all  350 million Arab peoples at once. Personally, I think that is exactly  what is going to happen over time. Warm up the bus for all the Arab  autocrats — and for you, too, Ahmadinejad. As one who has long believed  in the democracy potential for this part of the world, color me both  really hopeful and really worried about the prospects. 
 I am hopeful because the Arab peoples are struggling for more  representative and honest government, which is what they will need to  overcome their huge deficits in education, freedom and women’s  empowerment that have been holding them back. But getting from here to  there requires crossing a minefield of tribal, sectarian and governance  issues.        
 The best way to understand the potential and pitfalls of this transition  is to think about Iraq. I know that the Iraq war and the  democracy-building effort that followed have been so bitterly divisive  in America that no one wants to talk about Iraq. Well, today we’re going  to talk about Iraq because that experience offers some hugely important  lessons for how to manage the transition to democratic governance of a  multisectarian Arab state when the iron lid is removed.        
 Democracy requires 3 things: citizens — that is, people who see  themselves as part of an undifferentiated national community where  anyone can be ruler or ruled. It requires self-determination — that is,  voting. And it requires what Michael Mandelbaum, author of “Democracy’s  Good Name,” calls “liberty.”        
 “While voting determines who governs,” he explained, “liberty determines  what governments can and cannot do. Liberty encompasses all the rules  and limits that govern politics, justice, economics and religion.”         
 And building liberty is really hard. It will be hard enough in Middle  East states with big, homogenous majorities, like Egypt, Tunisia and  Iran, where there is already a powerful sense of citizenship and where  national unity is more or less assumed. It will be doubly hard in all  the other states, which are divided by tribal, ethnic and sectarian  identities and where the threat of civil war is ever present.        
 Not one was more divided in that way than Iraq. What did we learn there?  First, we learned that when you removed the authoritarian lid the  tensions between Iraqi Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis erupted as each faction  tested the other’s power in a low-grade civil war. But we also learned  that alongside that war many Iraqis expressed an equally powerful  yearning to live together as citizens. For all of the murderous efforts  by Al Qaeda to trigger a full-scale civil war in Iraq, it never  happened. And in Iraq’s last election, the candidate who won the most  seats, a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, ran on a multisectarian platform with  Sunnis. Lesson: While these tribal identities are deeply embedded and  can blow up at anytime, there are also powerful countertrends in today’s  more urbanized, connected, Facebooked Middle East.        
 “There is a problem of citizenship in the Arab world,” said Michael  Young, the Lebanese author of “The Ghosts of Martyr’s Square,” “but that  is partly because these regimes never allowed their people to be  citizens. But despite that, you can see how much the demonstrators in  Syria have been trying to stay nonviolent and speak about freedom for  the whole nation.”        
 Lesson two: What was crucial in keeping the low-grade civil war in Iraq  from exploding, what was crucial in their writing of their own  Constitution for how to live together, and what was crucial in helping  Iraqis manage multiple fair elections was that they had a credible  neutral arbiter throughout this transition: the U.S.        
 America played that role at a staggering cost, and not always perfectly,  but played it we did. In Egypt, the Egyptian Army is playing that  arbiter role. Somebody has to play it in all these countries in revolt,  so they can successfully lay the foundations of both democracy and  liberty. Who will play that role in Libya? In Syria? In Yemen?        
 The final thing Iraq teaches us is that while external arbiters may be  necessary, they are not sufficient. We’re leaving Iraq at the end of the  year. Only Iraqis can sustain their democracy after we depart. The same  will be true for all the other Arab peoples hoping to make this  transition to self-rule. They need to grow their own arbiters — their  own Arab Nelson Mandelas. That is, Shiite, Sunni and tribal leaders who  stand up and say to each other what Mandela’s character said about South  African whites in the movie “Invictus”: “We have to surprise them with  restraint and generosity.”        
 This is what the new leaders of these Arab rebellions will have to do —  surprise themselves and each other with a sustained will for unity,  mutual respect and democracy. The more Arab Mandelas who emerge, the  more they will be able to manage their own transitions, without army  generals or outsiders. Will they emerge? Let’s watch and hope. We have  no other choice. The lids are coming off.        
 
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